



Reading Political Integralism Using Eclectic and Dialectic Methods: A Study of Supomo's Reception of Spinoza, Adam Muller, and Hegel

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Abstract: *Supomo put forward the idea of political integralism (Staatsidee Integralistik), in the Indonesian State Establishment Session (1945), by referring to three Western philosophers: Spinoza, Adam Muller, and Hegel. The questions from an academic perspective that have not been answered until now are: Why integralism must be based on these three philosophers and not others, and why must it start with Spinoza and end with Hegel and not another arrangement? With this philosophical study method, I would like to explore why Supomo mentioned the three philosophers in such an arrangement: was it because of chronological or study method reasons? There are two possible answers for this question. First, Supomo took the appropriate elements from each philosopher according to the needs to fill the philosophical substance of his integralistic idea; so, it is an eclectic method. Second, considering that the three philosophers cannot simply be connected, let alone equated, and supported by the structure of Supomo's speech which is also dialectical, so he used the dialectical method. I argue in this study that integralism uses the dialectical method with its central idea of religion: Spinoza (thesis) rejects a religious state; Adam Muller (antithesis) accepts a religious state; and Hegel (synthesis) defines the co-existence of both, thus recognizing that religion exists in the state but the state does not have to be a religious one. Hegel's answer is the optio fundamentalis of Supomo's politics, namely rejecting the Islamic State demanded by Muslims and wanting to build a nation-state that includes all groups.*

Keywords: *integralistic state, organic state, dialectic, religious state, nation state*

Introduction

Political integralism is a term related to ideas put forward for the first time by Supomo at the Indonesian State Formation Session. In that session, he put forward a relatively new idea of the state in the field of politics or political philosophy, the idea of an integralistic state, namely a state whose character is to guarantee integral unity between the leader and the people and between all groups in the society. The idea of an integralistic state is indeed ideal for Indonesia, which is diverse in religion and ethnicity. Nevertheless, since the integralistic idea was put forward, its fundamental weaknesses have been realized. Because of this, Hatta, one of the trial participants, questioned the idea of an *integralistic state (negara integralistik)* as the idea did not guarantee democracy and human rights. However, most members of the

congregation saw the idea of integralism as a very brilliant one, especially since Supomo mentioned three famous Western philosophers as its sources, namely Spinoza, Adam Muller, and Hegel.¹

Integralistic staatsidee was put forward as a political idea in a political meeting, and therefore Supomo only mentioned the three names without making citations and references to which works of the three. However, if we read the text of the *Integralistic Staatsidee* speech and also read the works of the three philosophers mentioned, then we can say that Supomo is not wrong if these three philosophers are the sources of his integralistic ideas. The seeds of such ideas can be found in Spinoza's masterpiece, *Ethica More Geometrico Demonstrata*², and especially his works of political philosophy, such as *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*³ and *Tractatus Politicus*⁴; Adam Muller's masterpiece, *Die Elemente der Staatskunst*⁵; and Hegel's works, such as *Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie, Wissenschaft der Logik and Enzyklopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften in Grundrissen*⁶. However, will we be able to understand Supomo's integralism by reading all these works? The answer is 'not automatically' since the three philosophers cannot simply be combined, considering that their views are not only different but also contradictory.

If we are to read Supomo's integralism only from one philosopher, for example, we will certainly not be able to fully capture the essence of integralism. But if we are to read all the three philosophers at once, we will also experience difficulties, because the three philosophers not only have different views but are also contradictory ones. So far, the reading of such integralism in Indonesia has taken two approaches: first, reading separately, as done respectively by Magnis-Suseno⁷ and Jegalus⁸; second, reading simultaneously, as done by Simanjuntak.⁹ The main drawback of the first approach is that it can shrink Supomo's ideas. Minimizing in the sense that the readers measure Supomo as broadly as the content of one philosopher's thoughts without paying attention to the other two philosophers. For example, the Magnis-Suseno's and Jegalus's studies only rely on Adam Muller. Both do find many similarities or great compatibility between Adam Muller's *Die Elemente der Staatskunst* and Supomo's integralism. However, this model of reading ignores Spinoza and Hegel. Furthermore, Supomo does not say that the main source

¹RM. A.B. Kusuma, *Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945. Memuat Salinan dokumen Otentik Badan Untuk Menyelidiki Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan* (The Birth of the 1945 Constitution. Contains a copy of an authentic document, the Untoek Agency Investigates Preparatory Businesses for Independence), Jakarta: Indonesian Faculty of Law Publishing Agency, 2009, 124.

² Contained in *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, trans/ed. Edwin Curley, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985. For the purpose of this Paper, we use: Matthew J. Kisner (ed.), *Spinoza. Ethics Proved in Geometrical Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2018.

³ This work contains sharp criticism of religion with the state.

⁴ This work is a continuation of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, and was therefore published simultaneously: *A Theological-Political Treatise and A Political Treatise*, trans. R. H. Elwes, New York: Dover, 1952.

⁵ This is Adam Muller's masterpiece, two Volumes, edited by Jakob Baxa, Jena: 1923.

⁶ These three works can help readers understand Hegel's philosophical views on the State.

⁷ Franz Magnis-Suseno, *Filsafat Ilmu Kritis* (Philosophy as a Critical Science), Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1992, p. 89-102; and Franz Magnis-Suseno, *Pijar-pijar Filsafat. Dari Gatholoco ke Filsafat Perempuan, dari Adam Muller ke Posmodernisme* (Afterglow of Philosophy. From Gatholoco to Women's Philosophy, from Adam Muller to Postmodernism), Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2005, p. 58-70.

⁸ Norbertus Jegalus, *Das Integralistische Staatsverständnis nach Adam Muller (1779-1829) und seine Rezeption in Indonesia: Zur Debatte um die Gestalt des Indonesischen Staates und die Interpretation der Pancasila-Doktrin*, Hochschule für Philosophie, Philosophische Fakultät S.J, München, 2000.

⁹ Marsilam Simanjuntak, *Pandangan Negara Integralistik. Sumber, Unsur, dan Riwayatnya dalam Persiapan UUD 1945* (Integralistic View of the State. Sources, Elements and History in the Preparation of the 1945 Constitution), Jakarta: Grafiti Main Library, 1994.

of his integralism is Adam Muller, even though the contents of their views are very similar. Meanwhile, the method of simultaneously reading the three philosophers is not without difficulties either. The difficulty lies in the issue of which ideas from each philosopher that Supomo accepts, given that all three are different and even contradictory.

Facing these methodical difficulties, this study tries to offer two ways or, say, two methods of reading integralism: first, reading it using an eclectic method, a combined method, namely taking certain elements from each philosopher, which according to Supomo, elements These elements are appropriate and important for the teachings of integralism; and, second, reading integralism using the dialectical method a Hegelian sense, so that Spinoza's idea serves as the thesis, Adam Muller's is the antithesis, and Hegel's is the synthesis. Simanjuntak's study seems to use this dialectical method such that Supomo's *integralistic state* is considered to be a Hegelian state. We will use this method by determining which elements or themes from the three philosophers can be read dialectically. We cannot simply take Spinoza as the thesis, Adam Muller as the antithesis, and Hegel as the synthesis. We have to take into account the fact that this *Integralistic Staatsidee* was delivered as a political speech to respond to the condition of the congregation where Muslims wanted to establish an Islamic State, while Supomo's position, as a nationalist, was to want a nation-state.

Research Methods

This research is a philosophical research and therefore uses a qualitative Literature Study Method¹⁰. The method contains general methodological elements, such as interpretation, internal coherence, holistic, historical continuity, comparison, heuristics, and description. This means that the researcher, first,) collects data about Spinoza, Adam Muller, and Hegel through literature studies on their philosophical works and studies on their thoughts as well as collecting data about Supomo through literature studies, especially literature on the *Staatsidee Integralistik* Speech and academic studies on integralistic ideas. After that, the researcher explores the thoughts of the three Western philosophers and Supomo's thoughts to find the relationship of suitability or inconsistency among them, so that it can be established as to whether Supomo uses an eclectic method or a dialectical method. At this stage, I employ several philosophical methodological elements. They are as follows.

The *first* is *interpretation*, which is to be done by capturing the most basic meaning of *Staatsidee Integralistik* Supomo by interpreting the ideas of Spinoza, Adam Muller, and Hegel that are relevant to the main points of Supomo's political integralism. *Second, internal coherence*: The thoughts of the three Western philosophers are analyzed to find the main elements of each, then connected to Supomo's thoughts in order to see whether there is an internal coherence between the three Western philosophers and Supomo's thoughts. From there, the researcher will try to find which elements are the most central or dominant and which are more marginal in Supomo's thoughts.

The *third* one is *holistics*. Based on this conformity, the overall context of the thoughts of the three Western philosophers and Supomo's thoughts can be established. All elements of thought and philosophical

¹⁰ Anton Bakker & Achmad Charis Zubair, *Metodologi Penelitian Filsafat*. Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1994, hlm. 61-66. Bdk. Lexy J. Moleong, *Metodologi Penelitian Kualitatif*. Bandung: Remadja Karya, 1989, hlm.11-4.

conception (Spinoza's monism, Adam Muller's organism, and Hegel's idealism) are all used to assess the overall vision of Supomo's integralism. *Fourth, historical continuity*, which means digging into the historical roots of the thoughts of the three Western philosophers and Supomo. This means that the researcher will pay attention to the historical development of Spinoza's, Adam Muller's, and Hegel's thoughts in the West and then pay attention to the historical development of Supomo's thoughts.

Fourth, comparison. The researcher then compares Spinoza's monist philosophy, Adam Muller's organism philosophy, and Hegel's idealism to find the similarities and differences. Then such similarities and differences are compared with the main elements of Supomo's integralism. *Fifth, heuristics.* Finally, by carrying out the five stages above, a new understanding can be gained, namely that Supomo's reception of the three Western philosophers can only be understood as "*optio fundamentalis*" of Supomo's politics by reading them dialectically rather than eclectically. With this, Indonesian readers would get a new light for understanding Supomo's political integralism.

Integralistic Staatsidee Speech

The *Integralistic Staatsidee* speech was delivered by Prof. Supomo, on May 31, 1945, after several Islamic figures and nationalist figures gave speeches about the idea of the Indonesian State being established. Even though Hadikusumo and Wahid Hasim, two Islamic radicals, have not yet made their speeches, Supomo can already read the conditions of the debate, namely that the Muslims want to establish an Islamic State, while the nationalists want to establish a nation-state. The nationalists took this stance because they fully realized that only with the Nation-State that Indonesia, covering the entire archipelago from Sabang to Merauke, can be established. In other words, Supomo wanted to guarantee the unity of the entire region; but not only that, he in fact also wanted a perfect unity between the leaders and the people. For this reason, he delivered his speech with a typical philosophical structure, because he wanted a philosophical view of the state.

He opened his speech following the pattern of Scholastic philosophy, namely starting with Status Questions (issues): "If we want to talk about the basis of the system of government that we want to use for the Indonesian State, then the basis of that system of government depends on *Staatsidee*, on the form of the state that we want to use it for the development of Indonesia. On what basis will the Indonesian State be established? My honorable member Moh. Hatta and other speakers raised three questions, namely: First, whether Indonesia will stand as a unitary state (*eenheidstaat*) or a united state (*bondstaat*), or as an alliance of states (*saatenbond*). Second, the relationship between state and religion is questioned; and third, whether a Republic or a Monarchy."¹¹

The idea of an *Integralistic State* is Supomo's answer to these three problems. However, he did not immediately answer with an *Integralistic Staatsidee*. Instead, he first put forward two groups of theories about the state: first, individualistic state theory (liberal state); and, second, group state theory (class state). After that, Supomo stated: "Another school of thought regarding the understanding of the state is a theory that can be called *integralistic* theory taught by Spinoza, Adam Muller, Hegel, and others (18th and 19th

¹¹ RM. A. B. Kusuma, Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945. *Op. Cit.*, 123-124.

centuries). According to this idea, the state is not to guarantee the interests of a person or group, but to guarantee the interests of society as a whole."¹² It seems that here Supomo presents his thoughts dialectically: the thesis is the individual state (liberalism), then followed by the class state as the antithesis, and *integralistic* theory is the synthesis. This is evident from his assertion: "The state does not take sides with the strongest or largest group, it does not consider someone's interests as the center, but the state guarantees the safety of the entire nation as an indivisible unity."¹³

However, Supomo did not only rely on what state philosophers said but also on what happened and was done by the Indonesian people themselves. This can be seen in his speech: "Indeed, the basis and form of structure of a country is closely related to the legal history (*Rechtsgeschichte*) and social institutions (*sociale Structuur*) of that country...."¹⁴ Each country has its characteristics related to the history and style of its society. Therefore, the development politics of the Indonesian state must be adapted to the social structure of Indonesian society."¹⁵

To strengthen his argument about an *integralistic state*, which is not only based on philosophical theory but also the reality of the social structure of Indonesian society, Supomo put forward examples that should be rejected and that should be imitated. He put forward two examples of the forms of state that should not be imitated, namely the liberal state in Western Europe and the social state in Soviet Russia. These two examples of countries were rejected because "the basic understanding of the country is contrary to the nature of authentic Indonesian society".¹⁶ Meanwhile, two examples of the countries that are worth emulating are Germany and Japan. Germany was to be imitated because "the country is based on a totalitarian school of thought",¹⁷ where Supomo identified *integralistic* ideas with totalitarianism. Meanwhile, Japan was to be imitated not because of its being totalitarian or organic, but because "the country relies on kinship".¹⁸

After presenting the examples that should be imitated and those that should not be imitated, Supomo began to explain the characteristics of an *integralistic state*: "The Head of State and other government bodies must be a true leader, a guide towards the noble ideals, which are desired by people".¹⁹ But then Supomo reminded again that even so, "the state does not behave or act as someone omnipotent, who is independent of the human beings in its territory and who has its interests, regardless of the interests of its citizens as individuals (individualist ideology)."²⁰

Then he continued with his speech by stating the substance of an *integralistic state* in this concise formulation: "[...] according to the definition of an *integralistic State*, as an orderly nation, as an organized unity of people, then basically there will be no dualism between the State and the individual, there will be no conflict between the structure of state law and the structure of individual law [...]"²¹ He proceeded further:

¹² *Loc. Cit.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

¹⁴ *Loc. Cit.*

¹⁵ *Loc. Cit.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

¹⁸ *Loc. Cit.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

²⁰ *Loc. Cit.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

“The state will recognize and respect the existence of groups in real society, but individuals and all groups will be aware of their position as an organic part of the state as a whole, obliged to ensure unity and harmony between all parts.”²²

After explaining the substantive content of the idea of an *integralistic state*, Supomo stated its consequences, which involve three things: first, the relationship between state and religion, where the religious state is rejected; second, a form of government (Republic or Monarchy); and third, the country's economic system.²³ There are two interesting things that we should note here: first, what is placed first as a consequence of an *integralistic state* is not the form of government but rather the relationship between state and religion, which is explained at a greater length compared to the discussions about forms of government and economic systems. Supomo's intellectual energy was used seriously on the issue of the relationship between religion and the state, where he rejected the idea of a religious state (Indonesian Islamic State). Second, if Supomo is consistent with the *integralistic idea* of a unitary state of all elements in the state, especially if he follows Adam Muller's view, then the ideal state is a religious state; but he rejects a religious state. In fact, regarding the form of government and economic system, he follows a logical flow of – and is thus consistent with – his *integralistic ideas*.

Regarding the form of government, whether republic or monarchy, Supomo said: "In my opinion, the question of republic or monarchy does not relate to the basis of the structure of government. What is important is that the head of state and even all government bodies should have the qualities of a leader of the state and the people as a whole."²⁴ So, Supomo's answer is consistent with the *integralistic ideas* that have been explained. The key is the unity between the leader and the people. In Supomo's own words: "[...] he must be the true leader of the country. He must be united in spirit with the people as a whole."²⁵

Meanwhile, regarding the national economic system, it is also consistent with *integralistic ideas*: "In an integralistic country based on unity, in the economic field a system of state socialism (*staatsocialisme*) will be used [...] In the economic field, the state will also have a familial character because kinship is the nature of Eastern society, which we must preserve as well as possible. The mutual assistance system, the cooperative system should be used as one of the economic foundations of the Indonesian state."²⁶

Finally, the speech ended with the sentence: "And the Indonesian State, which was formed based on the unity of thought that I described earlier, will also be able to carry out its dharma (obligations) properly as a member of the Greater East Asian family."²⁷ So, Supomo delivered the speech while being fully aware of the shadow of power of the Japanese government.

²² *Loc. Cit.*

²³ *Loc. Cit.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

²⁵ *Loc. Cit.*

²⁶ *Loc. Cit.*

²⁷ *Loc. Cit.*

Reading Supomo's Integralism Using an Eclectic Method

In a strict sense, eclecticism is not a method, namely a systematic procedure to achieve a scientific goal, in this case, to understand the political philosophy of the three Western philosophers mentioned successively by Supomo in a political speech. Reading the speech using an eclectic method is an attempt to understand Supomo's integralism with the assumption that he compiled the *Integralistic Staatsidee* by taking certain suitable elements from the three philosophers. So, we posit that Supomo took certain elements that fit his idea of integralism and ignored other elements, from Spinoza, Adam Muller, and Hegel. Thus, it is possible that he took more from one philosopher than another. Therefore, the question in this case is: What elements did Supomo take from the three philosophers?

Spinoza

What elements did Supomo take from Spinoza (1632-1677) for the needs of his idea of integralism? There are three possible sources that Supomo took from Spinoza: first, the idea of the metaphysics of organic unity as contained in the *Ethica More Geometrico Demonstrata*, which says that there is only one substance and that substance is God²⁸; second, the idea of the separation of religion and state in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*²⁹; and third, the idea of an organic state as contained in the *Tractatus Politicus*³⁰. We begin with the idea of single-substance metaphysics contained in Part I-II of the book *Ethica*. As for humans and all other elements of natural reality, they are only methods (modes) of God's substance. *Deus Sive Natura*, God or nature, said Spinoza. God and nature are identical. With that, he adheres to metaphysical monism that there is only one reality, and that reality is God. Whatever exists in reality is only God's way of being, so nature is essentially God too. Meanwhile, Parts III-V of *Ethica* are part of the application of single-substance metaphysics, so the pantheistic monism put forward in parts I-II has implications for ethical theory. Here Spinoza wants to show the implications of the monistic structure for human inner attitudes. A moral person is a person who is one with God and this union is achieved through deepening understanding (*amor intellectualis Dei*).³¹

This view of unity between humans, nature, and the Divine is in line with the Javanese way of life. In all practical life, the Javanese view events in the empirical realm as inseparable from their relationship to the meta-empirical realm, as expressed by Mulder: "The cosmos, including life, objects and events in the world, is a coordinated and orderly unity, a unity in existence in which every phenomenon, material and spiritual, has a meaning far beyond what is apparent."³² This relationship between the empirical and meta-

²⁸Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza. Filsafat Praktis* (Practical Philosophy (trans. Fandy Hutari), Yogyakarta: Barbasari, 2018, p. 217-218. Cf. John Carriero, "On the Relationship Between Mode and Substance in Spinoza's Metaphysics," in Derk Pereboom (ed.), *The Rationalists: Critical Essays on Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, p. 133-164.

²⁹ Michael Petry, "Hobbes and the Early Dutch Spinozists," in Spinoza's Political and Theological Thought. C. De Dugh (ed.), Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1984, p. 63. Cf. also, William Sacksteder, "How Much Hobbes Might Spinoza Had Read," in *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, 11, 1980, p. 24-40.

³⁰ *Tractatus Politicus* is divided into 11 chapters: The Spinoza text, in English, which is used here, is taken from ISN ETH ZURICH (International Relations and Security Network. Primary Resources in International Affairs (PRIA): www.isn.ethz.ch

³¹ Franz Magnis-Suseno, *13 Model Pendekatan Etika. Bunga Rampai Teks-teks Etika dari Plato sampai dengan Nietzsche* (13 Models of Ethical Approaches. Anthology of Ethics Texts from Plato to Nietzsche), Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1998, p. 100. Cf. Spinoza, *Ethics, Op. Cit.*, p. 243-244.

³²Niels Mulder, *Mysticism and Daily Life in Contemporary Java. A Cultural Analysis of Javanese Worldview and Ethics as Embodied in Kebatinan and Everyday Experience*. Diss. Amsterdam, 1975, p. 17.

empirical realms underlies all individual and social activities of a Javanese person. Note the similarity with Supomo's words: "So the spirit of *kebathinan*, the spiritual structure of the Indonesian nation has the character and aspiration of unity of life, unity of *kawulo* and *gusti*, namely a unity between the outer world and the inner world, between the microcosm and the macrocosm, between the people and the leaders."³³

Javanese moral understanding also has similarities with Spinoza's ethical view, which relies on understanding. For the Javanese, the physical and spiritual aspects are united in humans.³⁴ Spinoza also views the body and soul not as two entities but a unity, where the soul occupies the primacy over the body. In Javanese moral metaphysics, at first glance, we view the external as superior, because it is through the external that we know and understand other people. However, it is not the external world that is most real; the inner world is. The inner world is the true reality because the inner world is where the forces that determine human life are located.³⁵ In his *Staatsidee* speech, Supomo said: "... the unity of life, the unity of *kawulo* and *gusti*, namely the unity between the outer world and the inner world, between the microcosm and the macrocosm."³⁶ So, the inner world is the true reality. The inner world contains the outer world. The outer world is only an expression of the inner nature. This view is similar to Spinoza's view of the body and soul, which states that there are no two but one and that one is the soul.

Thus, it is appropriate for Supomo to mention Spinoza as one of the thinkers on whom his *integralistic ideas* depend. Spinoza taught absolute monism, *Deus sive Natura*, and this went in line with the Javanese monism adhered to by Supomo, *manunggaling kawula gusti*. The difference is that Spinoza adheres to rational monism-pantheism while Supomo's Javanese worldview adheres to religious monism-pantheism. Therefore, to Magnis-Suseno's question: "Is monism what Supomo meant?",³⁷ our answer, based on the evidence above, is yes. As a political speech to unite all groups, especially religious groups who demand a religious state, it is a rational and wise answer. A religious state is certainly rejected because it does not accommodate all religious and ethnic groups.

This rejection of state religion goes in line with Spinoza's argument in his work titled *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*.³⁸ Spinoza rejected the religious state because the religious state was irrational. Religion is recognized for its existence within the state, but it must be separated from the state. Therefore, in a democratic country, even though there is religion, there are not two authorities, namely state authority and religious authority, but only one authority, namely state authority. Thus, the existence of religious authority based on the teachings of the Holy Bible is recognized but is under the authority of the state. This view of the separation of religion and state and the sole authority of the state is very valuable for Supomo in facing the demands of religious groups demanding an Islamic State at the *BPUPKI* Session. Supomo, from the nationalist camp, firmly rejected the demands of a religious state and based his rejection on Spinoza's thesis about the separation of religion and state and the thesis about the sole authority of the state.

³³ RM.A.B. Kusuma, Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, *Op. Cit.*, p. 126.

³⁴ Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java*, New York: The Free Press, 1969, p. 232.

³⁵ Harun Hadiwijono, *Man in the Present Javanese Mysticism*. Baarn: Bosch en Keuning, 1967, p. 104.

³⁶ RM.A.B. Kusuma, Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, *Op. Cit.*, p. 126.

³⁷ Franz Magnis-Suseno, Filsafat sebagai Ilmu Kritis, *Op. Cit.* p. 99.

³⁸ Norbertus Jegalus, "Tractatus Politicus dan Demokrasi: Risalah Model-model Rezim yang Rasional", in *Jurnal Ledalero*, Vol. 22, No. 2 Desember 2023, p. 103.

So, Supomo is right to take Spinoza as the source of the concept of the integralist state. The terminology of integralism is new in political theory and Supomo created the term to replace the term 'organic state'. The idea of an organic state is also contained in Spinoza's masterpiece, *Ethica more geometrico demonstrata*. In this *Ethica*, he talks about the metaphysics of substantial monism and then mentioned it again in *Tractatus Politicus*, in an organic metaphor: "So when we say that the best state is a state in which humans live their lives in harmony, I am talking about human life, which is characterized not only by blood circulation and other characteristics common to animals, but especially by reason, truth, virtue, and the life of the mind."³⁹

With this metaphor, Spinoza addresses the problem of political ontology: Is the state an individual with its own conatus, or not?⁴⁰ According to collectivists, the state designed by Spinoza is organic, namely a state that is like a great individual (macro-individuum). This view is based on Spinoza's words in the *Ethica*: "If... two individuals of the same nature are united with each other, they form an individual twice as strong as each one."⁴¹ Based on these words, collectivists argue that Spinoza paints a picture of this combined, higher individual, opening up the possibility of viewing the state as an individual. Thus, the state is an individual of individuals who have not only their bodies but also their minds (trans-individuality).⁴²

However, individualists (liberals) reject the collectivist interpretation, because according to them, the collectivist interpretation is contrary to the democracy that Spinoza fought for. According to Spinoza, only with democracy, or in democratic civil conditions, can humans become free individuals. Spinoza, furthermore, views freedom, especially freedom of thought (*libertas philosophicandi*), as the main characteristic of a rational state, namely a state that guarantees humans as citizens and humans as humans.⁴³ If the state is a large individual with its mind, and its conatus, then there is a threat to the freedom of small individuals, namely its citizens.

In this case, Supomo follows a collectivist interpretation, so the state is a macro-individuum, as seen in the following statement of his: "The state is an integral social structure, all groups, all parts, all members are closely related to each other and are an organic social unity".⁴⁴ That means that the hand as a hand cannot exist on its own; it only exists or lives as far as it is united with the whole, namely the body. Likewise, the foot as a foot cannot exist if it is not united with the body as a whole. In short, all parts or limbs must be united with the body as a whole because only in the organic whole can they exist; meanwhile, separating from the body means death. In Supomo's reception, the *organic* idea was accepted but replaced with his term, *integralistic*.⁴⁵

³⁹ Spinoza, *Tractatus Politicus*, *op. cit.* hlm. 16.

⁴⁰ Conatus, menurut Spinoza, usaha dasar atau perjuangan setiap yang ada untuk mempertahankan adanya (eksistensinya).

⁴¹ Walter Eckstein. "Rosseau and Spinoza: Their Political Theories and Their Conception of Ethical Freedom", in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 5 (3), 1944, p. 260.

⁴² Etienne Balibar, "Spinoza from Individuality to Trans-individuality", in *Medeleingen vanwege het Spinjozahuis*, Vol. 71, Delf: Eburon, 1997, p. 50.

⁴³ Juston Steinberg, *On Being Sui Iuris*, *op. cit.* p. 239-249.

⁴⁴ RM A>B. Kusuma, *Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, *op. cit.* p. 127.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* p. 126.

Adam Muller

In contrast with the early liberal philosopher Spinoza who theorized about democracy, Adam Muller wanted to reject liberal political views (democracy and human rights), especially the democratic values produced by the French Revolution. Adam Muller was oriented towards the Middle Ages, emphasizing the nobility of the noble class and a spiritual perspective on the state as an organism with a soul. For Muller, the country is truly alive (*der lebendige Staat*)⁴⁶ and has a soul like a human being. The idea of a firm, organic state that Supomo uses is found in Adam Muller, not Spinoza. According to Adam Muller, the state truly lives and has a soul like humans, whereas individual humans as its organic parts can only live in the unity of the state organism as a body. Spinoza wrote: "The state is the totality of human affairs, the union of these affairs into one living whole."⁴⁷ This idea emerged in Supomo's speech: "...the state guarantees the safety of life of the entire nation as an indivisible unity",⁴⁸ then continued by emphasizing that "state development is a living thing" and a living state is by nature inscribed in Indonesia's original culture: "So the spirit of *kebatinan*, the spiritual structure of the Indonesian nation has the character and aspirations of unity of life, unity of *kawulo* and *gusti*."⁴⁹

In the sense of integralism as an organism, the state is seen as an institution with a soul and life. The individual only achieves his goal when he is united with all other individuals in the state, just as the body's organs are united with the body as one organism. So, here members of citizens, even groups of citizens and groups of society are seen as organs of the institution called the state. Just as the purpose of an organ is to support the life of the entire body organism, so too do the members of the state aim to support the life of the state. Even though each individual has their own life and activities, they only achieve their true existence within the state as a whole, just as hands, feet, eyes, and ears cannot exist outside of unity with the body as one organism.⁵⁰

Thus, the individual's goal exists no longer in himself as taught by Kant but in the state, so only the state has a goal in itself. Individual human beings are not for themselves but for the sake of the whole organism, namely the state. The decisive element in the view of the organic state is that it is unreasonable for individuals or groups of society to want to defend their interests outside the interests of the state organism. In this way, the state is no longer an institution established to serve its members but rather the opposite, namely the members serve the state. Why should individuals serve the country? In Muller's view, the state has existed since humans have existed, the state is not a human creation as was believed by the French Revolution. He rejects the view that there is *status naturalis*, a condition where the state does not yet exist, before the creation of the state, the so-called *status civilis*. It is as if the state is something that can be created and dissolved at will: "The state is not a manufacturer, company, insurance institution, or trade union; it is the intimate union of all physical and spiritual needs, all physical and spiritual wealth, all the inner and outer life of the nation into an energetic, infinitely moving and living whole."⁵¹ Adam Muller's

⁴⁶ Norbertus Jegalus, *Das Integralistische Staatsverständnis nach Adama Muller*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 49.

⁴⁷ Adam Muller, *Die Elemente der Staatskunst*, *Op. Cit.* p. 48.

⁴⁸ RM. A. B. Kusuma, *Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, *Op. Cit.*, 125.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

⁵⁰ Adam Muller, *Ausgewählte Schriften zur Staatsphilosophie* (ed. Rudolf Kohler), Munschen: Theatiner Verlag, 1923.

⁵¹ Adam Muller, *Die Elemente der Staatskunst*, *Op. Cit.* p. 37.

words are in line with Supomo's words: "Humans as individuals are not separated from other people or the outside world, groups of people, in fact, all groups of creatures, everything is mixed and interrelated, everything influences and their lives are intertwined. This is the totalitarian idea, the *integralistic* idea of the Indonesian nation which is also manifested in the original state structure."⁵²

Thus, Adam Muller has a very firm view of the organic state, because the state truly lives and has a soul like humans. The state is not a human creation but has existed and lived since humans existed, so there is no difference between *naturalis* status (the state has not been established) and *civilis status* (the state has been established). Moreover, a living and soulful country is total, not totalitarian. It is a totality in the sense that various aspects of society's life are united in the state and all of this can truly exist and live within the state because all of it is inspired by the state. Even though they are all united and inspired by the state, the state does not erase these aspects. In other words, the state does not run everything by itself. In the organism of the state, all the circles of life proceed according to the internal rules and laws of each individual, but they are united in the state, and only in that state do they all discover their true purpose.

This view contradicts the beliefs and ideals of the Enlightenment regarding limiting state power, guaranteeing human rights, human equality for all citizens, and participation in democracy in state governance. The teachings of this organic state opposed the ideals of the French Revolution. Adam Muller wrote: "Did not all the fatal errors of the French Revolution converge in the insane notion that the individual could break out of his connection with society and from the outside overthrow and destroy that which he displeased."⁵³ So, he rejected the ideology of the French Revolution, which he considered not only wrong but crazy, because it started from the idea of humans as individuals who exist outside of society, where the social aspect comes later, even though, according to him, the individual is always social and through the state he has a past together and look to the future together.

Hegel

Interestingly, Hegel is placed on a par with Adam Muller. Both German philosophers indeed lived and worked in the same period, Hegel (1775-1854) and Adam Muller (1779-1829), but their philosophical views were different, in that Adam Muller opposed the Enlightenment and the French Revolution while Hegel admired the French Revolution. as a breakthrough in the freedom that determined historical progress for European and world civilization. The question is: Is Supomo right in taking Hegel as a philosopher who teaches the unity of the state, given that Hegel's understanding of unity is different from the two previous philosophers? Hegel talks about unity, but it is a dialectical unity, meaning unity as a totality of moments that move in the tension of thesis and antithesis, so the tension of negativity (denial) and positivity.⁵⁴ Hegel's basic idea is that progress is achieved through denial. Each moment (stage) in its positivity is always limited, partial, and therefore inadequate, incompatible with itself. Only through denying it does one attain the fullness of one's truth. The ideology of state unity is also explained within this dialectical framework, where the state is the result of society's denial of the family. The family (*thesis*) is denied by society (*antithesis*), which then produces a state (*synthesis*). Therefore, the state is seen as higher than are family and society.

⁵² RM. A.B. Kusuma, *Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, p. 126.

⁵³ Adam Muller, *Die Elemente der Staatskunst, Op. Cit.*, p. 26.

⁵⁴ Alexander Ulfig, *Lexikon der Piholosophischen Begriffe*, Wiesbaden: Fourier Verlag, 1997, p. 84-86.

It is in this overall dialectical sense that Hegel exalts the state, recognizing the supremacy of the state over the individual and society.⁵⁵

Here, the state is understood by Hegel according to the framework of his teachings about *Sittlichkeit* (socio-moral order),⁵⁶ which is the culmination of the dialectical movement between law, which is opposed to morals, and this opposition ultimately produces a third moment, which he calls *Sittlichkeit*, namely a moment which is no longer purely legal and also not purely moral but a moment of higher quality than both. In this moment of *Sittlichkeit*, three dialectical moments is also at work, namely: *Die Familie* (family), *Die burgerliche Gesellschaft* (citizen society), and *Der Staat* (state).⁵⁷ The family is opposed by the community, and this opposition ultimately produces a higher form, namely the state. We can say that *Sittlichkeit* is a social-ethical totality that is formed and sedimented in the course of the history of a community. People's motivation to work at these three moments is different: in the family, it is motivated by love; in society, citizens are motivated by egoism; and in the state, it is motivated by the public interest. Here, the dialectic is clear: the family which is motivated by love is opposed to society, which is motivated by the pursuit of self-interest; and finally is also opposed to the state, which works to pursue the public interest. It is on this basis that Hegel values the state very highly compared to individual humans and society.⁵⁸

In the family, there is collectivity but no subjectivity. On the other hand, in a citizen society, there is subjectivity, but there is no collectivity, because everyone only pursues their own interests. This is where the state appears as a synthesis by dialectically transforming the positive elements found in the family and society, such as: in the family, there is an organic unity that places common interests above the personal interests of each family member, but the drawback is that there is no awareness of rational subjectivity; in citizen society, there is subjectivity as an independent individual, but the weakness is the attitude of self-remembering which tends to end in anarchy. Here the state comes to the fore by taking positive elements from the family (collectivity) and society (subjectivity). Thus, the state is the fullness or totality of the advantages of both the family and society.⁵⁹

In that sense, Hegel's state is called organic, so it is more in the sense of totality, because the state is the embodiment of the whole or unity between the positive elements of the family and society. However, in this case, we need to be careful, because Hegel uses unique terminology and even in the reverse sense, such as: for the family he calls it *Allgemeinheit* (universality); for society, he calls it *Besonderheit* (particularity); while for the state he calls it *Einzelheit* (individuality).⁶⁰ The state as individuality is a synthesis between universality and particularity. Hegel wrote: "The essence of the modern state is to unite

⁵⁵ Hans Jorg Sandkuhler (ed.), *Handbuch Deutscher Idealismus*, Stuttgart: Verlag J. B. Metzler, 2005. P 205-207. Cf. Herbert Schnadelbach, *Hegel zur Einfuhrung*, Hamburg: Junius Verlag, 1999, p. 138-140.

⁵⁶ Franz Magnis-Suseno, Pijar-pijar Filsafat, *Op. Cit.*, p. 87.

⁵⁷ Alexander Ulfig, *Lexikon der Philosophischen Begriffe*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 382.

⁵⁸ Herbert Schnadelbach, *Hegel praktische Philosophie. Ein Kommentar der Texte in der Reihenfolge ihrer Entstehung*, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000, p. 262-264.

⁵⁹ Franz Magnis-Suseno, Pijar-pijar Filsafat, *op. cit.* p. 71-85.

⁶⁰ Hegel, *Rechtsphilosophie*, *op. cit.* Zusatz Nr. 261. Cf. Fitzerlard K. Sitorus, "Masyarakat Warga dalam Pemikiran G.W.Hegel", in *Ruang Publik. Melacak Partisipasi Demokratis dari Polis sampai Cyberspace* (ed. F. Budi Hardiman), Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2010, p. 140.

together the universal and complete freedom from particularity".⁶¹ This teaching of the state as individuality is what later gave rise to an interpretation as if the state were a totalitarian state which is a kind of macro-individuum as argued in Spinoza. However, Hegel's actual intention is in the context of his dialectics. Therefore, individuality (*Einzelheit*) here is not macro-individuum, but rather dialectical individuality, so it is not the concept of a concrete individual human being, a leader, the *Fuhrer*.

Thus it is clear that in Hegel's system, which we may call a monistic system, every dualism is resolved by rational synthesis. At the moment of the state, the dualism between the individual and society is eliminated, so the individual and society are absorbed in the state. With this, Hegel succeeded in synthesizing the conflict of schools of thought that prioritize togetherness against individualism with his doctrine of human rights. Supomo relies on this Hegelian view when he says: "... there will be no dualism of State *und staatsfreie Gesellschaft* will not require the guarantee of Grund und Freiheitsrechte from the individual contra State, because the individual is nothing other than an organic part of the State, which has its position and obligation to participate in organizing the glory of the State, and vice versa because the State is not a body of power or a political giant that stands outside the environment of a person's freedom."⁶²

Reading Supomo's Integralism Using the Dialectical Method

Dialectics is Hegel's philosophical method which is often identified with the triad method, a three-step method: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, even though Hegel himself did not use these three terms. Hegel means dialectics in the sense of dialogue, as a dual pattern, namely a pattern of mutual denial. This denial gives rise to mutual justification and ultimately progress. A mistake occurs when we interpret the third moment, namely synthesis, only as a moment of combination of two previous conflicting stages (*thesis* and *antithesis*). The moment of synthesis is not a compromise or fusion but rather an "*Aufhebung*",⁶³ which we can interpret as "renewal" "strengthening" or "exaltation". The use of dialectics to read Supomo's integralism is to be done in *Aufhebung's* sense; so, it is not just a combination. That means that Spinoza is to be contrasted with Adam Muller, which then produces a higher view that is not just a combination or compromise of the differences between Spinoza and Adam Muller. So, Hegel's view is to be seen as the *Aufhebung* of two previous opposing views (Spinoza and Adam Muller). Thus, the difference between the eclectic and dialectical methods is clear, in that the eclectic method places the three philosophers in the same position, while the dialectical method places the three philosophers in a different position where the moment of synthesis occupies an "elevation" over the two previous moments.

However, there is still a question that must be answered: Do we simply place Spinoza's views as the thesis, Adam Muller as the antithesis, and Hegel as the synthesis? The answer is 'no' because in this way we will not be able to understand Supomo's integralism which has a practical aim, namely how to establish an Indonesian State that is diverse in religion and ethnicity into a unitary state that includes all groups and all people. Supomo, as a nationalist, faced the demands of religious groups who wanted to

⁶¹ Hegel, Rechtsphilosophie, *op. cit.* Zusatt, Nr. 260.

⁶² RM AB. Kusuma, Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

⁶³ Alezander Ulfing, Lexikon der Philosophischen Begriffe, *Op. Cit.*, p. 46. Cf. Sindhunata, Dielema Usaha Manusia Rasional. Kritik Masyarakat Modern oleh Max Horkheimer dalam rangka Sekolah Frankfurt (The dilemma of rational human endeavor. Criticism of modern society by Max Horkheimer in framework of the Frankfurt School), Jakarta: Gramedia, 1983, p. 34.

establish an Islamic State. Therefore, we can only read dialectically towards these three philosophers, according to certain aspects or themes. There are several aspects or dimensions, or we might also call them 'themes', which are used as a kind of common thread between them to be read dialectically. Those themes are rationality, freedom, democracy, rule of law, method, social contract, and religion.

First, rationality. The theme of rationality has a dialectical structure, such as Spinoza, serving as the thesis, theorized about the rational state; then Adam Muller, the antithesis, rejected the rational state, and Hegel, the synthesis, returned to talking about the rational state (*Vernunftstaat*)⁶⁴ at a higher level. First, Spinoza (*thesis*) talks about the rational state or rationality being a kind of normative benchmark for assessing a good state, whether monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy. A monarchy is a rational system because it has a constitution and a monarchical council; the aristocracy is also rational because it has a constitution and an aristocracy council; but only democracy is the most rational one because it bases the state on law and has a larger council than the monarchy and aristocracy⁶⁵. Second, Adam Muller appears as an antithesis because he rejects the rational state. After all, according to him, the state is not the work of reason, so the state is not a *Begriff* (concept) but an *Idee* (idea). The concept is a rigid philosophy, once and for all, and therefore unable to contain the dynamics of the problem that is to be expressed, while *Idee* is a dynamic idea, therefore Adam Muller talks more about *Staatsidee* and not *Staatsbegriff*.⁶⁶ Third, Hegel talks about the *Vernunftstaat* (rational state). Reality is a dialectical process, so humans experience this process in their consciousness as an increase in their comprehensive understanding; and this awareness also reveals a process of increasing rationality in history. Even though this theme of rationality fulfills a dialectical structure, Supomo, like Adam Muller, rejects rationalism, which, according to him, produces liberal democracy and demands human rights. So, Supomo did not accept the theme of rationality for his *integralistic state*. He expressed his rejection in the speech, saying: "Gentlemen, you should be aware of the consequences of the stance of rejecting individuals. Rejecting the basis of individualism also means rejecting the parliamentary system, rejecting the Western democratic system, rejecting the system that equates humans with each other as mere numbers that are all of the same value."⁶⁷

Second, freedom. All the three philosophers talk about freedom but in different ways and dimensions. First, Spinoza argues that in the field of metaphysics, the only one who is free in the sense of self-determination is God while humans are not. He has a strictly deterministic view, namely the view that there is no freedom, either in the physical or mental world. Every human action is caused by a series of cause-effect relationships.⁶⁸ However, in his social philosophy, Spinoza emphasized freedom of thought (*libertas philosophicandi*). Based on this freedom of thought, he criticized the Jewish Scriptures which did not contain absolute truth.⁶⁹ Second, Adam Muller views freedom as the highest value for humans.

⁶⁴ Fitzgerald K. Sitorus, Masyarakat Warga dalam pemikiran G.W.F. Hegel, *Op. Cit.*, p. 146-147.

⁶⁵ Lewis Feuer, Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1987, p. 151. Cf. Justin Steinberg, "Spinoza on Civil Liberation", in *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 47(1), 2009: 145-164.

⁶⁶ Norbertus Jegalus, Das Integralistische Staatsverständnis nach Adam Muller, *Op. Cit.*, p. 49-50.

⁶⁷ R.M. A. B. Kusuma. Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, *Op. Cit.* p. 131.

⁶⁸ Eckstein, Walter, Rousseau and Spinoza, *Op. Cit.* p. 259-291.

⁶⁹ Guadalupe Gonzales Dieguez, "Zero Degree of Interpretation? Spinoza and the Literal Meaning of Scripture in the Jewish Exegetical Tradition", in Antonio Bento & Jose Maria Rose (ed.), *Revising Spinoza? Theological Political Treatise*. Hildesheim-Zurich-New York: Olms, 2013, 237-363.

However, what is meant by freedom is not negative freedom (freedom from various restrictions), but positive freedom, namely freedom as the ability to develop oneself: "Freedom to exercise one's unique strengths and essence, to grow, move, conflict."⁷⁰ Thus, all the forces in society live and develop, and that is what supports the whole. Third, Hegel explains freedom in a very different way, namely in the framework of historical dialectics, where historical progress, whether in reality or thought, is progress in freedom. Hegel argued that both our individual and collective understanding, as well as the structure of human life together, all move dialectically towards more advanced or greater freedom. In other words, history moves towards ever greater freedom. Thus, it is clear that all the three philosophers talk about freedom, but the problem is: first, there is no dialectical structure here; and secondly, it is precisely the ideology of freedom that Supomo wants to fight against. So, it is clear that the dialectic of freedom is not accepted by Supomo.

Thus, it is clear that the three philosophers are talking about freedom, but the problem is the following. First, there is no dialectical structure here, and their understanding of freedom is different: Spinoza talks about freedom in the sense of liberalism, Adam Muller touches on freedom in the sense of the organic state understanding so that it only recognizes positive freedom and rejects negative freedom; while Hegel discusses freedom in the framework of the dialectical understanding of history so that freedom is dialectical. Second, it is precisely the understanding of freedom that Supomo wants to fight against, as seen in this speech: "The basis of the legal structure of the Western European state is the individual and liberalism. This individual nature, which concerns all areas of life (economic legal systems, arts, and others), separates humans as individuals from their society, alienating them from all other relationships."⁷¹ So, it is clear that the idea of freedom is not accepted by Supomo.

Third, democracy. Spinoza supported democracy while Adam Muller and Hegel rejected it. In *Tractatus Politicus*, Spinoza describes three types of rational regimes, namely monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy; but the most rational regime, in his view, is democracy. Spinoza supports democracy because this system is very rational and is able to ensure the living together in a state. The main reason Spinoza supports democracy as the best regime model is because of the epistemic advantages of democracy, namely the tendency of large popular assemblies to make wiser laws⁷². This is because, according to Spinoza, large collective decisions force members to always think only about noble things.⁷³ Meanwhile, Adam Muller and Hegel rejected democracy. Adam Muller rejects democracy because democracy is a product of reason which gives birth to a spirit of individualism, even though the facts show that humans have always been social. He rejected democracy because the concept of people's power from democracy was very strongly opposed to his idea of an organic state.⁷⁴ Meanwhile, Hegel rejected democracy, because according to him, the state was the *Aufhebung* of the individual and society, so its existence was higher than the individual and society. Therefore, the government does need to be controlled, but not by a parliament elected by the

⁷⁰ Adam Muller, *Die Elemente der Staatskunst*, *Op. Cit.* p. 133.

⁷¹ RM. A. B. Kusuma. *Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, *Op. Cit.* p. 125.

⁷² Norbertus Jegalus, Johannes Subani, "Tractatus Politicus dan Demokrasi: Risalah Model-model Rezim yang Rasional", in *Ledalero*, Vol. 22, No. 2. December 2023, p. 109.

⁷³ Cf. Justin Steinberg, "Spinoza and Political Absolutism", dalam Yitzhak Melamed and Michael Rosenthal (eds.), *Spinoza's Political Treatise. A Critical Guide*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 175-180.

⁷⁴ ⁷⁴ Norbertus Jegalus, *Das Integralistische Staatsverständnis nach Adam Muller*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 56. Cf. Franz Magnis-Suseno, *Pijar-pijar Filsafat*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 69.

people democratically but rather by two chambers, namely representatives of work organizations (*Korporationen*) and representatives of social classes (*Staende*). Thus, even though Adam Muller and Hegel support Supomo in rejecting democracy, this does not fulfill the dialectical structure. So, it was not the theme of democracy that Supomo accepted.

Thus, it is clear that there is no dialectical structure, instead Adam Muller and Hegel reject democracy. Although this rejection goes in line with Supomo's integralism, which rejects democracy, it does not fulfill the dialectical structure. "The method of appointing a state leader should not be followed by the method of choice according to the Western democratic system, because the choice according to the Western democratic system is based on individual understanding," Supomo emphasized in the debate. So, it is very clear that democracy is not accepted by Supomo.

Fourth, Rechtsstaat (the rule of law). The three philosophers supporting the rule of law differ only in the emphasis. Supomo, as a legal expert who was assigned to draft the constitution of the Indonesian State, certainly explored these three philosophers. However, the problem here is that there is no dialectical structure. According to Spinoza, a rational state, whether monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, is a state based on a constitution.⁷⁵ Adam Muller also teaches the same thing, that is for the sake of unity of action a state needs to have law; but he rejects natural law because natural law allows people to demand human rights before the state. This teaching was rejected by Adam Muller because it presupposed a distinction between *status naturalis* and *status civilis*, a position which he rejected in the first place. So, Adam Muller only accepts positive law, but not strict positivism. He rejects any formulation of clear legal structures and categories. He understands the law according to the *Idee*, not according to the concept (*Begriff*), so that the law is alive and not rigid like the formulations of legal rules.⁷⁶ Meanwhile, Hegel clearly and firmly taught that the state is a state of law, but the law is placed in a dialectical structure: *Recht* (thesis) – *Moral* (antithesis) – *Sittlichkeit* (synthesis). So, Supomo does not understand the rule of law.

With this, it is also clear that Supomo does not accept the concept of a state of law. The three philosophers all teach a state of law, only differing in understanding the nature and existence of law in the state. Spinoza adheres to a liberal state of law; Adam Muller adheres to an organic state of law that he only recognizes positive law made by the state and rejects natural law (*Naturrecht*); while Hegel adheres to a state of law from a dialectical understanding such that law is always in dialectic with morals. Meanwhile, Supomo himself as a legal expert (*Adatrecht*), who graduated from the Netherlands, also adheres to a state of law, but not a state of law generating from liberalism but a state of law that is based on the culture of the Indonesian nation. Supomo gave a speech on this, stating: "It is true, the basis and form of the structure of a country are closely related to the legal history (*Rechtsgeschichte*) and social institutions (*sociale structur*) of that country. In connection with that, what is fair and good for a country, is not necessarily good and fair for another country, because the circumstances are not the same."⁷⁷ Then at the end of the speech he

⁷⁵ Justin Steinberg, "Benedict Spinoza: Epistemic Democrat", in *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 27 (2), 2010, 145-147.

⁷⁶ Cf. Franz Magnis-Suseno, *Pijar-pijar Filsafat*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 66-67.

⁷⁷ RM. A. B. Kusuma. *Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, *Op. Cit.* p. 125.

emphasized once again that "based on the understanding of the country as a unity of the Indonesian nation which is composed of an integralistic legal system..."⁷⁸

Fifth, method. Only Spinoza uses the consensus (harmony) method because, according to him, the goal of the state is *pax vitaeque securitas* (peace and security of life).⁷⁹ Meanwhile, Adam Muller and Hegel used the conflict method. For Adam Muller, conflict (*Streit*) is not to be understood in the sense that each person wants to eliminate his opponent, but rather in the sense that each element expresses its aspirations and hopes freely and competitively with the others. In other words, Adam Muller emphasizes unity in polarity. The unity of opposite poles, but each only has meaning in interconnection with others, and they therefore presupposes each other to constitute the whole. This idea was then worked out more firmly by Hegel in his dialectic, making clear that we only progress in life if we do not hate negativity. Only through denial (negativity) do we progress in various dimensions of life, including the political dimension of life. This dialectical process does not only take place in understanding or mind, but also in social, cultural, and state realities. Thus, it is clear here that even though Spinoza emphasized harmony and that emphasis was supported strongly by Supomo's way of life as a Javanese, because there was no dialectical structure here, it was certainly not accepted by Supomo.

Thus, it is clear here that although Spinoza emphasizes harmony and it is very much supported by Supomo's way of life as a Javanese, but because there is no dialectical structure here, it is certainly not accepted by Supomo. However, the question is whether Supomo adheres to the consensus method or the conflict method. In terms of method, it is also clear that Supomo does not accept the idea of a method of organizing society. Because, although he prefers Spinoza's method, i.e. consensus, which goes in line with the character of the Indonesian nation, he does not accept this method because it is not dialectical in its structure.

Sixth, social contract. All the three philosophers rejected the social contract theory. Initially, Spinoza adhered to Hobbes's social contract theory, especially in *Tractatus Theologicus-Politicus* Chapter 16. Here, he considers how people escape from pre-civil conditions (*status naturalis*) and move towards civil conditions (*status civilis*) through a social contract as taught by Hobbes. However, in the *Tractatus Politicus*, his views changed, namely, to maintain his political naturalism, he no longer distinguished between *status naturalis* (pre-civil condition) and *status civilis* (civil condition). For him, there is no difference between humans in a natural condition, which in Hobbes' theory is the condition of *bellum omnes contra omnes* (war of all against all), and humans in a civil condition (*status civilis*), which is obtained through social agreement. Thus, in the *Tractatus Politicus* Spinoza demonstrated a sharp break with the contractarian conception of state formation that he had outlined in his earlier work, the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*.⁸⁰ In the same vein, Adam Muller rejected the distinction between the state of nature (*status naturalis*) and the state of the state (*status civilis*).⁸¹ Adam Muller's reason is that the state is not a

⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 132.

⁷⁹ Cf. Justin Steinberg, "Spinoza and Political Absolutism", in Yitzhak Melamed and Michael Rosenthal (eds.), *Spinoza's Political Treatise. A Critical Guide*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 175-180.

⁸⁰ Etienne Balibar, "Spinoza: from Individuality to Trans-individuality", in *Medeleingen vanwege het Spinozahuis*, Vol. 71, Delft: Eburon, 1997, p. 50.

⁸¹ Norbertus Jegalus, *Das Integralistische Staatsverständnis nach Adam Muller*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 57-58.

creation of the human mind as rationalism believes, but rather that the state has existed since humans existed, not that human existed first and then created the state.

Meanwhile, Hegel rejected the theory of state agreement based on his distinction between *Verstand* (intellect) and *Vernunft* (reason) in explaining the dialectical movement: family (thesis) contrasted with citizen society (antithesis) towards the state as synthesis. Hegel views the moment of citizen society as what he calls "*ausseren Staat*" (external state), namely the state seen based on needs. He wrote: "One can first see this system of needs as an external state, that is, a state based on needs and viewed with the intellect (*Verstand*)."⁸² The external state here has the same substance as the state in the view of social contract theory as taught by Locke and Hobbes, namely that the state is the result of the construction of the human intellect with the aim of '*Überwindung des Naturzustandes*' (overcoming natural conditions) as well as helping humans to pursue their interests.

According to Hegel, the state referred to in the social contract theory, namely the state as it changes from naturalist status to civilized status, cannot yet be called a state, but rather a *burgerliche Gesellschaft* (citizen society), in which each individual struggles only to realize his own goals, individual goals or interests. Such a state, which is only at this stage of citizen society, stands on a fragile foundation because, theoretically, it can be created and therefore can also be dissolved. For Hegel, the state based on social contract theory was a view that was not yet philosophical. The new state is truly a philosophical view, namely a state that is not formed because it responds to the needs or interests of individuals who enter into contracts, but is formed based on what he calls *Notwendigkeit* (necessity), namely institutions that are formed by the moments of self-realization of the Objective Spirit⁸³ or the development of increasingly concrete and rational freedom.⁸⁴ So, citizen (civil) society is only a dialectical moment towards what should be, namely the state, and therefore civil society is an integral part of the state.

This discussion of social contract theory was also rejected by Supomo, as seen in his speech which said that an *integralistic state* is a country that "rejects a system that equates humans with each other like mere numbers, all of which have the same price." These words better describe the spirit of Adam Muller's and especially Hegel's view of the "external state", where humans within the state are seen as a construction of the human intellect, just as humans use their intellect to create goods for use. Then Supomo clarified his views on the nature of an *integralistic state*, saying: "This school of thought has concrete and real characteristics, it does not abstract away all circumstances (like the theory of individualism)."⁸⁵ The problem here is that although the rejection of social contract theory is in line with Supomo's integralism, there is no dialectical structure here.

Seventh, religion. Spinoza (thesis) taught the separation of religion and state; then opposed by Adam Muller (antithesis) who taught the unity of religion and state; and this opposition produced a higher

⁸² Hegel, *Rechtsphilosophie*, par. 183. Cf. Fitzgerald K. Sitorus, Masyarakat Warga dalam Pemikiran G.W.F. Hegel, *Op. Cit.*, p. 146.

⁸³ Franz Magnis-Suseno, *Etika Politik. Prinsip-prinsip Moral Dasar Kenegaraan Modern* (Political Ethics. Basic Moral principles of modern State), Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1999, p. 248-249.

⁸⁴ Franz Magnis-Suseno, *Pijar-pijar Filsafat*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 78-82.

⁸⁵ RM. A. B. Kusuma. Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, *Op. Cit.* p. 128.

condition in Hegel as a synthesis, namely the recognition of the co-existence of religion and state.⁸⁶ In Hegel, religion is separated from the state, but no longer in the sense of Spinoza who tends to be negative about the existence of religion, namely as an irrational institution, when compared to rational state institutions. For Hegel, religion and the state are co-existent, which means that religion is not the state and *vice versa*, so they are separated not because religion is bad as Spinoza thinks it is. Thus, here the dialectical movement as taught by Hegel occurs.

Spinoza discusses the thesis of the separation of religion and state in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*.⁸⁷ He firmly rejected the religious state because such a state was irrational. Then it is further strengthened by the single authority thesis which teaches that, in a democratic country, even though there is religion, there are not two authorities, namely state authority and authority, but only one authority, namely the state. Religious authority based on the teachings of the Holy Bible is under the political authority of the state.⁸⁸ This view was later negated by Adam Muller who taught that the most ideal state is a religious state, namely a state with one faith⁸⁹. Adam Muller presents himself here as a Christian thinker who thinks that the ideal state is a Christian state: "The personal surrender of the individual to the whole only becomes possible after, through the living inner Christian law, the relationship between man and mankind, is determined purely in true and lasting reciprocity and sealed with the most beautiful death, so with the most complete surrender."⁹⁰ This resistance by Adam Muller ultimately gave birth to *Aufhebung* in Hegel, who rejected the religious state but did not reject religion from existing within the state. Hegel views religion very positively because, for him, religion is an area of subjective freedom and therefore cannot be entered by the state.⁹¹ So, the state does not have any rights over the inner beliefs of its citizens. What citizens believe, think, and do not believe is beyond the authority of the state to determine.

Conclusion

Based on the excavation of the three sources with two methods, i.e. eclectic and dialectical, we can finally conclude that reading integralism with an eclectic method is inadequate for capturing Supomo's fundamental political option, namely wanting a unitary state that includes all religious, ethnic, and racial groups in Indonesia. If we are to read this intergalactic *Staatsidee* with an eclectic method, we can fall into the error of Supomo's fundamental political option, namely wanting to establish a Unitary State. An eclectic reading is a reading that takes certain elements from each philosopher that are endorsed by Supomo's

⁸⁶ Norbertus Jegalus, *Das Verhältnis von Politik, Religion und Zivilreligion, untersucht am Beispiel der Pancasila*. München: Herbert Utz Verlag, 2009, hlm. 33-35. And cf. Norbertus Jegalus, "Modernizing Religion and Culture: Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana's Philosophical Perspective of Values", in *Indonesia Journal of Interdisciplinary Islamic Studies*, Vol. 3. No. 2, 2020, p. 1-18.

⁸⁷ Batuschat, Wolfgang, "The Ontological Basis of Spinoza's Theory of Politics", in *Spinoza's Political and Theological Thought*. C. De Deugh (ed.). Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1984, 30-36.

⁸⁸ Justin Steinberg, "Spinoza's Curious of Toleration", in Yitzhak Melamed and Michael Rosenthal (eds.) *Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise: A Critical Guide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 210-213.

⁸⁹ Cf. Norbertus Jegalus, "Hubungan antara negara dan Gereja: Implikasinya terhadap penyelenggaraan pendidikan agama dan pendidikan keagamaan", in *Jurnal Ledalero*, Vol. 12. No. 2 Desember 2013, p. 221-222.

⁹⁰ Adam Muller, *Die Elemente der Staatskunst*, I, p. 279. "Von der Notwendigkeit einer theologischer Grundlage des gesamten Staatswissenschaften und der Staatswirtschaft insbesondere" (Ed. Albert Josef Klein, Jena: 1982), dan "Die innere Staatshaushaltung. Systematisch dargestellt auf theologischer Grundlage" (Ed. Albert Josef Klein, Jena: 1983).

⁹¹ Hegel wrote in *Rechtsphilosophie, Zusatz 94*: "State laws cannot possibly affect mental attitudes, because in moral conviction I am for myself, and coercion here has no meaning."

integralism. These elements may be appropriate and important for Supomo's integral teachings, but such a reading forgets one important thing, namely that Supomo was an academic who was very obedient to scientific principles such as systematic thinking.

A dialectical reading can lead us to the final result that Indonesia is not a Religious State but a National State that includes all groups based on Hegel's view. This great German philosopher did separate religion and state, but not the separation as taught by Spinoza, but he did not unite religion and state as taught by Adam Muller either. The relationship between religion and state in Hegel is a relationship of co-existence because religion and state are essential needs for humans as individual-social beings. Therefore, religion and state exist in society according to their respective essences and existences. So, it is valid that Simanjuntak calls the Integralistic State a Hegelian State. With this, we finally realize that the Integralistic State, although it can reject a religious state and become a nation-state, the weaknesses of the Hegelian state still haunt Indonesia. Therefore, the author recommends a further study on the relationship between the Integralistic State and the Hegelian State. The study is to concern the compatibility or similarities and differences between the two as well as the practical consequences of their implementation to the Indonesian State, which has a religious plurality.

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